Retail Electricity Competition by Joskow, Paul & Tirole, Jean
  
 
Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics CWPE 0430 
  
 
 
Retail Electricity Competition  
 
 
Paul Joskow and Jean Tirole 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            
          
         
 
    
      Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
             Center for Energy and 
      
Environmental Policy Research 
 
CMI Working Paper 44 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Department of
Applied Economics
Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Not to be quoted without permission 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            
         
          
 
    
    Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
             Center for Energy and 
      Environmental Policy Research 
 
CMI Working Paper  
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Department of
Applied Economics
Retail Electricity Competition∗
Paul Joskow† and Jean Tirole‡
April 21, 2004
Abstract
We analyze a number of unstudied aspects of retail electricity
competition. We ﬁrst explore the implications of load proﬁling of
consumers whose traditional meters do not allow for measurement of
their real time consumption, when consumers are homogeneous up to
a scaling factor. In general, the combination of retail competition and
load proﬁling does not yield the second best prices given the non price
responsiveness of consumers. Speciﬁcally, the competitive equilibrium
does not support the Ramsey two-part tariﬀ. By contrast, when con-
sumers have real time meters and are billed based on real time prices
and consumption, retail competition yields the Ramsey prices even
when consumers can only partially respond to variations in real time
prices. More complex consumer heterogeneity does not lead to adverse
se1ection and competitive screening behavior unless consumers have
real time meters and are not rational. We then examine the incentives
competitive retailers have to install one of two types of advanced me-
tering equipment. Competing retailers overinvest in real time meters
compared to the Ramsey optimum, but the investment incentives are
constrained optimal given load-proﬁling and retail competition. Fi-
nally, we consider the eﬀects of physical limitations on the ability of
system operators to cut oﬀ individual customers. Competing retailers
have no incentive to determine the aggregate value of non-interruption
of consumers in the zones they serve, preferring instead to free ride on
other retailers serving consumers in the same zones.
∗We are grateful to Claude Crampes, Bruno Jullien, Stephen Holland, Patrick Rey and
the participants at the IDEI-CEPR conference on “Competition and Coordination in the
Electricity Industry,” January 16–17, 2004, Toulouse and at the ninth annual POWER
conference, UC Berkeley, March 19, 2004 for helpful discussions and comments.
†Department of Economics, and Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research,
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Paris, and MIT.
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1 Introduction
The paper analyzes a number of hitherto unstudied aspects of retail competi-
tion in electricity markets. Its starting point is that ﬁnal consumers may not
react to the real time prices that emerge in wholesale electricity markets for
(at least) three reasons: First, they do not have incentives to properly adjust
their consumption to real-time prices if only their total consumption over a
given period is recorded, i.e., they are on a traditional meter. Second, even if
their consumption is recorded on a real-time basis, transaction costs associ-
ated with monitoring the evolution of hourly prices and constantly optimizing
the use of equipment are enormous for small consumers. Third, consumers,
even if they want to, may not be able to adjust their consumption freely.
They may be constrained by the physical attributes of distribution networks
as they are presently conﬁgured; in particular, rationing usually occurs at
the level of zones rather than individual consumers.
In order to analyze competition among electricity retailers or Load Serv-
ing Entitites (LSEs) for the ﬁnal (retail) consumers, it is convenient to group
the latter into four categories:1
Price-sensitive consumers are endowed with real-time (RT) meters and either
autonomously or through communication with the LSE, adjust their demand
eﬃciently to the evolution of the wholesale spot market price.
Price-insensitive consumers with real-time meters are endowed with RT me-
ters, but are only partially aware or unaware of RT prices and therefore
do not adjust their consumption perfectly as real time prices vary from
1The grouping in three categories is an oversimpliﬁcation. There are a number of
partially price sensitive categories, such as those subject to time-of-use pricing (retail
prices are preset for certain blocks of time) or critical peak pricing (that combines time-
of-use pricing with high retail prices for a number of critical hours per year to be declared
by the utility). See Borenstein et al (2002) for a review of recent innovations.
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minute to minute and hour to hour. At the extreme, they are fully (RT)
price-insensitive. Such consumers are not irrational; rather they trade oﬀ
the transaction costs invoked above and the savings in their electricity bill.
While these consumers do not react to real time prices their actual real time
consumption can be measured and assigned to their LSE for settlement pur-
poses.
Consumers on traditional meters are metered only once a month or every
few months (in some countries meters are read even less frequently), and
pay a per-kWh electricity charge that is independent of the actual timing
of their overall consumption. The case of consumers on traditional meters
can be decomposed into two subcases, depending on the way the consumers’
LSE is charged for its energy purchases. In the case of a monopoly local dis-
tribution company, this company pays the real-time price of the consumer’s
consumption: Even though the LSE is then unable to measure the realized
proﬁle of any given consumer with a traditional meter in its distribution
area, it observes and pays for the realized total consumption proﬁle of all
such customers in the area.
Under retail competition by contrast, an LSE other than the local distri-
bution grid owner and serving such a consumer pays a unit electricity charge
based on the “load proﬁle” of the consumer. That is, it pays the average
wholesale price for the load proﬁle that is representative of the consumer’s
class regardless of the actual time pattern of the individual customer’s con-
sumption and the relationship between this actual physical consumption and
the contemporaneous RT wholesale prices.
3
Table 1 summarizes this taxonomy.
Meter measures: Consumer RTP
sensitive?
LSE’s energy
purchase cost
corresponds to:
1 entire consumption
proﬁle
(RT meter)
yes customer’s RT proﬁle
2 entire consumption
proﬁle
(RT meter)
no / partial customer’s RT proﬁle
3 aggregate
consumption only
(traditional meter)
no customer’s RT proﬁle
4 aggregate
consumption only
(traditional meter)
no load proﬁled
consumption
Table 1
The case of price-sensitive consumers who react eﬃciently to real time
prices (case 1 in Table 1) is the textbook representation of consumer de-
mand. Borenstein and Holland (2003,a,b) study retail competition when
price-sensitive consumers (case 1) and price-insensitive consumers endowed
with real-time meters (case 2) co-exist, and LSEs can use only linear prices.
This paper extends their analysis of case 2 (Section 3) and treats cases 3 and
4 in which consumers are endowed with traditional meters (Section 2).
The paper focuses on two possible failures of retail price signals to ad-
equately reﬂect the scarcity conveyed by real time wholesale market price
signals. The ﬁrst failure arises at the consumer level when only her aggre-
gate consumption is measured. Because the consumer then does not pay
more when consuming mainly at peak when wholesale prices are high than
when spreading consumption more equally across peak and oﬀ-peak hours,
the consumer consumes too much at peak and too little oﬀ peak. The second
failure occurs at the retailer’s level, when the latter’s individual consumers’
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real time intake again is not measured by the system, which then charges the
retailer on the basis of some estimated consumption load proﬁle rather than
the LSE’s consumers’ actual load proﬁle.
Section 2 analyzes retail competition among load serving entities (LSEs)
in a world in which consumers are homogeneous (possibly up to a scale
parameter) and on traditional meters. Section 2.1 characterizes the second-
best optimum and shows that it can be implemented in the absence of retail
competition. By contrast, Section 2.2 and 2.3 show that under load proﬁling,
retail competition (with or without the incumbent distributor) leads to a
retail price equal to the average wholesale power cost and diﬀering from the
socially optimal retail price.
Section 3 takes on the case (case 2) in which consumers are on real-time
meters, but do not react or only partially react to the real-time prices. We
here build on the analysis of Borenstein and Holland (2003a,b) and expand
on it in a number of ways: (i) We argue that partial responsiveness requires
considering alternative representations of consumer demand; (ii) we allow
competing LSEs to oﬀer non-linear prices to retail consumers. Unlike Boren-
stein and Holland, we ﬁnd that with homogeneous and rational consumers
retail competition leads to the second-best optimum; this is no longer true
with boundedly rational consumers.
Section 4 extends the analysis to situations in which consumers diﬀer
in other aspects than just scale, i.e., they have diﬀerent load proﬁles, and
investigates the possibility of adverse selection and competitive screening.
Section 5 shows that given the price ineﬃciencies associated with load
proﬁling, LSEs face the right incentives when oﬀering their customers en-
hanced metering equipment, and so subsidies for such equipments are not
5
warranted.2
Last, Section 6 analyzes the implications of limitations in the controlla-
bility of the distribution circuits. These limitations imply that price sensitive
consumers may be rationed along with everyone else, and that LSEs cannot
generally demand any speciﬁc level of rationing that they desire to reﬂect
their consumers’ valuations. At best one can then elicit only the aggregate
willingness to pay for reliability in any given joint interruptibility zone. The
section discusses both market mechanisms that are needed to reach a “third
best” and the diﬃculties that make the phasing out of non-market mecha-
nisms unlikely when there is retail competition.
2 Consumers on traditional meters
2.1 Model and social optimum
States of nature (or, equivalently, periods) are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. fi denotes
the frequency of state i. Because we focus on competition on the demand
side, we take the wholesale prices as exogenous, and we identify states of
nature by the wholesale price pi, with pi increasing in i. [We will discuss this
identiﬁcation later on.]
For the sake of simplicity, let us ignore rationing for the moment. We
consider a representative retail consumer on a traditional meter with demand
Di(p) when facing price p in state i, with D
′
i < 0. Let Si (Di(p)) denote the
associated gross surplus, with S ′i = p. Note that consumers are assumed to
be homogeneous. They may diﬀer in the size of their demand, though: That
is, they can be indexed by σ > 0, such that a consumer of type σ has demand
qi = σDi(p) and gross surplus σSi (qi/σ). We normalize σ to be equal to 1,
2We do not consider metering technologies where there are economies of scale or density.
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but nothing is changed if consumers diﬀer in their scale σ.3 [More general
forms of heterogeneity are discussed in Section 4.]
Assumption 1. The function E [(p− pi)D′i(p)] is decreasing in p.4
The retail consumers are physically served by a local grid owner (usually
also called the incumbent distributor, or transmission and distribution service
provider). Because we are not interested here in the price of access to the
grid, we normalize to zero any delivery, metering and customer service costs
that continue to reﬂect responsibilities of the distribution grid owner. Thus,
when we later introduce LSEs, their only cost will be either the purchase
of energy from the wholesale market in real time or, in the case of load-
proﬁled consumers, the load proﬁled variable charge for power supplied from
the wholesale market to be paid for power delivered by the local grid owner.
We consider two-part tariﬀs, consisting of a monthly subscriber charge and
a per-kWh variable charge.5 We will later note that focusing on two-part
tariﬀs involves no loss of generality.
A consumer on a traditional meter cannot obtain the ﬁrst-best utility,
UFB, that she would obtain if her demand were controlled to perfectly adjust
to the RTP:
UFB ≡ E [Si (Di (pi))− piDi (pi)] . (1)
A Ramsey social planner for consumers with traditional meters chooses
prices, namely single per unit retail price p∗ and ﬁxed fee A∗, so as to max-
imize the consumer’s expected net surplus subject to the budget balance
3Neither the social planner nor the LSEs need to observe the consumer’s scale σ in
advance: They can infer it ex post from the consumer’s total consumption.
4This assumption is made mainly for analytical convenience. It is satisﬁed in particular
if the demand functions’ curvature is small enough (|D′′i /D′i| small).
5Oﬀers by retailers to residential customers in England and Texas that we have reviewed
have a ﬁxed monthly charge plus one or more tiers of kWh charges.
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constraint:
U∗ ≡ max
{p∗,A∗}
E [Si (Di (p
∗))− p∗Di (p∗)]− A∗
s.t.
E [(p∗ − pi)Di (p∗)] + A∗ ≥ 0. (2)
At the optimum, the budget constraint is binding, and the Ramsey planner
maximizes the joint surplus:
U∗ = max
p∗
E [Si (Di (p
∗))− piDi (p∗)] , (3)
yielding the following formula:
E [(p∗ − pi)D′i (p∗)] = 0. (4)
Assumption A1 implies that (4) has a unique solution.
To get some feel for what the Ramsey price entails, suppose for example
that the elasticity of demand comes from the installation of air conditioning
units. Suppose further that there are only two periods: oﬀ-peak (1) and peak
(2), with respective wholesale prices p1 and p2. Then, the Ramsey price is
p∗ = p2 in the US and p∗ = p1 in France, since summer is part of the peak in
the US and is oﬀ peak in France.6 Thus the Ramsey price would be greater
than the average annual wholesale price of electricity in the US and below
the average annual wholesale price in France.
Let us now consider the case of an LSE whose energy purchase cost cor-
responds to its customers’ actual load proﬁle (case 3 in Table 1). As we have
argued, this is the case when customers in an area are served by a monopoly
distribution company. The LSE then chooses the two-part tariﬀ (p,A) so as
6If “installation” referred to electric heating, then p∗ = p2 in France since winter is the
peak period.
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to maximize its proﬁt
E [(p− pi)Di(p)] + A
subject to the consumers being granted a certain utility level U (0 if the
monopoly is unregulated, higher if regulated):
E [Si (Di(p))− pDi(p)]− A ≥ U.
This program is of course the dual of the Ramsey program above. We thus
obtain:
Proposition 1 Traditional meters give rise to consumer moral hazard: Con-
sumers consume relatively too much on peak and too little oﬀ peak.
(i) The Ramsey usage price is given by
E [(p∗ − pi)D′i (p∗)] = 0.
(ii) The Ramsey (second-best) allocation prevails in the absence of retail com-
petition.
Remark (optimality of two-part tariﬀs): We have assumed that the Ramsey
planner oﬀers two-part tariﬀs. Could a better allocation be obtained through
more complex pricing structures?
With traditional meters, the social planner (or an LSE for that matter)
cannot do better than with a two-part tariﬀ. At best he can hope to control
total consumption through the marginal charge, while the load curve is cho-
sen by the consumer without any concern for the actual cost of purchasing
energy. More formally, the social planner is limited to total-consumption
based tariﬀs T (Q). Suppose that the planner selects the consumer’s total
consumption Q, and charges an amount T for this. The consumer then
chooses her load curve so as to solve:
maxE [Si (Di)] subject to E [Di] = Q.
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Letting p denote the shadow price of the constraint, S ′i (Di) = p, and so the
allocation is the same as under a two-part tariﬀ.
2.2 Retail competition for load-proﬁled consumers:
independent retailers
We analyze the competitive outcome with load proﬁled customers in two
environments. In the ﬁrst, the local grid owner is subject to a line-of-business
restriction. He provides access or delivery service to retailers, but is not
allowed to compete for the ﬁnal consumer. In the second, this line-of-business
restriction is lifted and so the incumbent distributor is permitted to compete
with independent retailers. We assume either that the distributor separates
its retail “supply” business into a ring-fenced aﬃliate that is treated like any
other retailer (as in the UK and in Texas), or that the retail arm maximizes
the proﬁt of the vertically integrated ﬁrm.7
In this subsection, we assume that (pure) retailers, but not the local grid
owner, compete for load-proﬁled consumers and can oﬀer two-part tariﬀs if
they choose to do so.8 Retailers’ settlement obligations for wholesale power
costs are then based on their customers’ load-proﬁled consumption.9 To com-
7A further complication is that when retail competition is ﬁrst introduced the distrib-
utor as retailer initially cannot “compete” in the normal sense, but rather is required to
oﬀer default service at a regulated price. These default service prices have been set in
many diﬀerent ways. We view these regulated default service obligations as transition
arrangements and focus our analysis on a post transition retail competition regime where
there is no regulated default service requirement.
8We are interested solely in the price eﬀects of retail competition. We thereby ignore
some beneﬁts of competition( such as improved incentives to oﬀer better metering, tariﬀs,
total energy management services or hedging packages) as well as some potential costs
of retail competition (such as consumer churn and poaching, duplicative or misleading
advertising expenditures, and competitive screening for credit quality and high volume
consumers).
9The aggregate demand of all consumers served through a particular distribution net-
work is measured on a real time basis. Since the aggregate real time consumption obli-
gations must add up to the aggregate real time supplies of power delivered over the dis-
tribution network, a set of “load proﬁles” must be applied to the monthly, bi-monthly or
quarterly consumption measured for customers without real-time meters. For example,
consider a customer with a standard meter read on a monthly basis with 1000 kWh of
10
pute the price per kWh paid for wholesale energy by retailers for each cus-
tomer they have signed up, a, suppose that, in equilibrium, retailers’ variable
(per-kWh) charge to consumers is p. Average consumption (load proﬁled)
per consumer is E [Di (p)] and the wholesale price paid by the retailers for
energy is
a (p) =
E [piDi (p)]
E [Di (p)]
. (5)
We use the notation a for “access charge” by analogy with the economics
literature on variable charges paid by entrants for access to regulated bot-
tlenecks (local loop, etc.).10 This access charge must be understood as the
average wholesale power cost paid by retailers.
Let us deﬁne the “average wholesale cost price”, pˆ, as the marginal retail
price that balances an LSE’s budget in the absence of a ﬁxed charge:
E [(pˆ− pi)Di (pˆ)] = 0.
Intuitively, pˆ exceeds the Ramsey price p∗ if the state of nature impacts
consumption recorder for the previous month. The 1000 kWh of monthly consumption
then must be allocated to the 720 hours of the previous month for settlement purposes.
This is accomplished by assigning the customer to a group or class of customers thought
to have similar consumption. A consumption or load proﬁle is developed for each group
based on real-time metered consumption patterns of a sample of customers in each class.
An individual customer who consumed no electricity during very hot summer days (be-
cause she was on vacation for half the month) would still have her measured monthly
consumption allocated to some hot summer day hours based on her group’s load pro-
ﬁle. The load proﬁle-based allocations must also satisfy an adding up property so that
all power measured to have ﬂowed through the distribution network is fully allocated to
retail consumers. There are at least two ways to do this. One way is to load proﬁle all
customers without real-time meters whether they are served by competitive retailers or
the distribution company providing default retail service. Another way is to load pro-
ﬁle only the customers with traditional meters of competitive retailers and subtract the
resulting hourly aggregates from the real-time metered consumption for the entire distri-
bution system, leaving the distribution company/retailer with settlement obligations for
the residual.
10Note that our setup is equivalent to assuming that the distribution grid owner pur-
chases the power in the wholesale market and then resells it to each LSE based on the
real time metered or load proﬁled consumption of the customers they have signed up. The
access charge a is then the price LSEs pay to compensate the distribution grid for the
costs of the wholesale power it has purchased on their behalf.
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demand more than marginal demand. We will therefore be led to consider
three cases:
Case 1 :
E [piDi(p)]
E [Di(p)]
>
E [piD
′
i(p)]
E [D′i(p)]
. for all p.
In this case, p∗ < pˆ.
Case 2 :
E [piDi(p)]
E [Di(p)]
<
E [piD
′
i(p)]
E [D′i(p)]
. for all p.
In this case, p∗ > pˆ.
Case 3 :
E [piDi(p)]
E [Di(p)]
=
E [piD
′
i(p)]
E [D′i(p)]
. for all p.
In this case, p∗ = pˆ.
Examples : For the additive linear with state-contingent intercept case Di(p) =
di − h(p), we are in case 1. For the multiplicative case, Di(p) = dih(p), then
p∗ = pˆ (case 3).
Lemma 1. (i) Cases 1 through 3 can be characterized by how the average
wholesale cost price varies with the marginal retail prices:
a′ > 0 in case 1
a′ < 0 in case 2
a′ = 0 in case 3.
(ii) In all cases, a(p) > p for p < p̂
a(p) < p for p > p̂.
Proof : Part (i) is obtained by diﬀerentiating (5). To demonstrate part (ii),
it suﬃces to show that a′(p) < 1 whenever a(p) = p, or after a few computa-
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tions:
H(p) = E [(p− pi)D′i + Di] > 0.
We know that a(p) > p for p small (since a(p) ≥ E [pi]) and a(p) ≤ p1 < p
for p going to inﬁnity. Hence, if the equation a(p) = p has multiple so-
lutions (an odd number greater than one) the function H(p) must be in-
creasing over at least some range. But H ′(p) = E [2D′i + (p− pi)D′′i ] <
E [D′i + (p− pi)D′′i ] < 0, a contradiction.
A retailer designs his oﬀer so as to solve:
max
{p,A}
E [(p− a)Di (p)] + A
s.t.
E [Si (Di (p))− pDi (p)]− A ≥ U¯ ,
where U is the net surplus obtained by the consumer from subscribing with
a rival retailer.
The retailer therefore selects p so as to maximize the joint surplus:
max
p
E [Si (Di (p))− aDi (p)] ,
or
(p− a)E [D′i (p)] = 0,
yielding
p = a.
In equilibrium, a is given by (5). Hence
p = pˆ.
Furthermore, A = 0: Retailers charge no monthly fee and just pass their
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variable cost of wholesale power through to the consumer.11 Except in case
3, retail competition is, under load proﬁling, inconsistent with a Ramsey
outcome.
For future reference, let URC (“RC” for “retail competition”) denote the
consumers’ equilibrium utility:
URC ≡ E [Si (Di (p̂))− p̂Di (p̂)] . (6)
Proposition 2 Pure retail competition under load proﬁling delivers linear
pricing at the average wholesale power cost p̂ despite the fact that LSEs have
the possibility of oﬀering two-part tariﬀs. The marginal price of electricity
for the retail customer is therefore higher than the Ramsey price in case 1,
and smaller in case 2; it is equal to the Ramsey price only in case 3.
Remark 1 : The Ramsey optimum can be achieved through a per customer
subsidy or tax levied on retailers. Thus, let a retailer pay A + aQ when his
customer consumes Q. The ﬁxed charge A is over (or under) and beyond any
delivery, metering and customer service costs that continue to reﬂect respon-
sibilities of the distribution grid owner (these costs have been normalized at
zero). Faced with an access tariﬀ (A, a), retailers optimally pass this tariﬀ
through to their customers (A = A and p = a). The break-even constraint
of the distribution grid owner is then:
A+ E [(a− pi)Di(a)] = 0.
The Ramsey outcome can be obtained by setting a = p∗, and then A so
as to achieve budget balance, but (except in the non-generic case 3) this
11Borenstein-Holland (2003a,b) may appear to have derived an equivalent “third best”
result. However, their analysis does not consider load proﬁling and assumes that LSEs
must oﬀer linear tariﬀs. We derive results for situations that reﬂect their assumptions in
Section 3.
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requires a departure from relying on load proﬁled consumption to calculate
the wholesale price charged to retailers, in that the variable access charge
diﬀers (except in case 3) from the consumption-weighted average wholesale
market price corresponding to the consumption induced by marginal price
p = a.
Remark 2 (rationing): We have assumed away rationing. In the presence of
rationing, the consumers’ gross surplus and demand depend on the price they
face, but also on the probability αi of rationing in state of nature i. We refer
to Joskow-Tirole (2004) for a detailed discussion; that paper in particular
shows that in the absence of load proﬁling and provided that LSEs can choose
the extent αi of state-contingent rationing, then retail competition delivers
the second-best outcome. For simplicity, let us focus here on the special
case of perfectly foreseen outages associated with rolling blackouts. The
consumers’ gross surplus and demand in state i are then αiSi (Di) and αiDi.
In the context of load proﬁling, it makes sense to assume that LSEs take αi as
exogenous, since rationing is zonal and retail competition with load proﬁling
corresponds to competition within a zone. LSEs, as earlier, maximize the
joint surplus:
max
p
{E [αi [Si (Di(p))− aDi(p)]]}
yielding:
E [αi (p− a)D′i(p)] .
Again, it is optimal for LSEs to pass the average wholesale price a onto
consumers:
p = a.
And so
p =
E [piαiDi(p)]
E [αiDi(p)]
.
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2.3 Incumbent distributor competing with indepen-
dent retailers for load-proﬁled customers
Consider next the situation in which the distributor is also permitted to
compete for load-proﬁled customers. We ﬁrst assume that the LSE behaves
so as to maximize proﬁts for the parent company as a whole. We then observe
that nothing is altered by a ring-fencing rule that requires the aﬃliate to
maximize its own proﬁts rather than those of the parent company.
a) Let us ﬁrst show that the incumbent distributor’s oﬀers of the Ramsey
tariﬀ invites entry as long as pˆ = p∗. [As before p̂ is the marginal retail price
that balances the LSE’s budget in the absence of a ﬁxed charge.] Suppose in-
deed that the distributor oﬀer tariﬀ (p∗, A∗). The load-proﬁled access charge
or average wholesale power cost when the distributor serves all consumers is
a∗ ≡ E [piDi (p
∗)]
E [Di (p∗)]
.
Consider an independent retailer contemplating a small-scale entry at some
tariﬀ
(
p¯, A¯
)
. We assume small-scale entry so that the entrant can take the
access charge as given. Large-scale entry modiﬁes the access charge that is
assessed ex post, by modifying the average load proﬁle. Alternatively, we
could assume that a∗ is ﬁxed in advance based on Ramsey load proﬁles. This
independent retailer entrant can make a positive proﬁt provided that he oﬀers
a higher joint surplus than the Ramsey level.
Let
U (p¯, a∗) ≡ E [Si (Di (p¯))− a∗Di (p¯)]
denote this joint surplus. Note that
U (p∗, a∗) = U∗.
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Furthermore,
∂U
∂p¯
(p¯, a∗) = E [(p¯− a∗)D′i (p¯)] ,
and so the independent retailer optimally charges
p¯ = a∗.
The independent retailer entrant charges a higher variable price than the
incumbent
a∗ > p∗
if and only if
E [(pi − p∗)Di (p∗)] < 0 ⇐⇒ A∗ > 0.
It may seem surprising that an entrant can (except in the non-generic case
a∗ = p∗ i.e., pˆ = p∗) enter against an incumbent oﬀering the Ramsey tariﬀ.
The point is that the entrant beneﬁts from an eﬀective subsidy from the
incumbent, who then operates at a loss given the entry.12 The subsidy arises
as a consequence of the fact that the distributor’s obligation to wholesale
suppliers is equal to the aggregate metered consumption for the entire distri-
bution system net of the load proﬁled consumption assigned to independent
retailers. As a corollary, the incumbent distributor cannot oﬀer the Ramsey
access charge.
b) Thus, assume that the incumbent distributor cum retailer is regulated so
as to reach the Ramsey optimum in the presence of retail competition. That
is, it is instructed to maximize social welfare subject to the budget balance
condition; it charges prices (p,A). The variable charge paid by retailers for
each kWh consumed by their retail customers, a, is based on the average load
12This loss is equal to
E [(pi − a∗)Di (a∗)] ∝ [E [piDi (a∗)]E [Di (p∗)]− E [piDi (p∗)]E [Di (a∗)]].
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proﬁle of the incumbent’s consumers; because the incumbent distributor can
always duplicate what retailers do, we can assume without loss of generality
that it serves the market (but, to serve the market, it must provide at least
the net surplus oﬀered by competitive retailers).
Let
V (p) ≡ U (p, p) = E [Si (Di(p))− pDi (p)]
with V ′(p) = −E [Di (p)]. The analysis in Section 2.2 implies that with
load proﬁling competitive retailers optimally oﬀer a linear tariﬀ with price
equal to the average wholesale power cost. And so competitive retailers oﬀer
consumer net surplus equal to V (a (p)). Note further, that because entrants
prefer to oﬀer a linear price a(p) to oﬀering marginal price p and charging a
ﬁxed fee equal to the “deﬁcit” [a(p)− p]E [Di(p)],
V (a(p)) ≥ V (p)− [a(p)− p]E [Di(p)]
with strict inequality unless p = a(p), i.e., p = p̂.
The constrained Ramsey distributor cum retailer then maximizes the con-
sumers’ utility
max
{p,A}
[−A + V (p)]
subject to two constraints:
A + E [(p− pi)Di (p)] ≥ 0
and
−A + V (p) ≥ V (a (p)) .
The ﬁrst constraint is the incumbent distributor cum retailer’s zero-proﬁt
condition, and the second is the contestability constraint created by the
threat of entry by independent retailers.
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From the budget constraint,
V (p)− A ≤ V (p) + E [(p− pi)Di (p)] = V (p) + [p− a (p)]E [Di (p)]
≤ V (a(p)) ,
with strict inequality unless a(p) = p, or equivalently p = p̂. Hence, the
incumbent distributor cum retailer can do no better than pure retail com-
petition. Intuitively, the parent company by construction breaks even, and
therefore the aﬃliate cannot do better than rival retailers, who compete with
the same instruments.13
Remark on “ring-fencing”: In the U.S. and UK there are aﬃliate rules that
are designed to separate regulated lines of business (e.g. transmission and
distribution) from unregulated lines of business (e.g. competitive generation
and retailing). The rules typically require (a) cost separation to avoid cross-
subsidization of unregulated lines of business by regulated lines of business,
(b) information transfer restrictions that limit transfers of “private informa-
tion” between regulated and unregulated aﬃliates, (c) transfer price rules
requiring any services transferred from the regulated entity to the unregu-
lated entity to reﬂect either their fair market value or a regulated price and
(d) equal treatment regulations that require the regulated aﬃliates to of-
fer services under the same terms and condition to unaﬃliated companies
competing with their unregulated aﬃliates as they oﬀer to their unregulated
aﬃliates. These rules are designed to deﬁne constraints on the ability of a
vertically integrated ﬁrm to maximize the joint proﬁts of the entire enterprise.
In our set-up such additional constraints on the aﬃliates have no impact, as
13More generally, the incumbent distributor cannot deliver a net surplus to consumers
in excess of V (p̂) by serving some consumers but not all. To see this, note that the retail
aﬃliate must make a non-negative proﬁt (since a is computed so that the parent company
always breaks even). By the same reasoning as above, the retail aﬃliate cannot oﬀer more
than V (p) + E [(p− a)Di (p)] < V (a) unless p = a. But if p = a, everyone (aﬃliate,
independent retailers) oﬀers retail price a, and so a = p̂.
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the combination of break-even access charges and retail competition com-
pletely deprives the vertically integrated incumbent of any discretion.14
Proposition 3 Under load proﬁling and retail competition, the Ramsey opti-
mum is generically not attainable. The incumbent retailer in the constrained
Ramsey optimum charges the average wholesale power cost price p̂.
Remark (lagged computation of the average wholesale power cost): We have
assumed that settlements occur “ex post”, so a is computed on the basis of
the actual aggregate consumption pattern over the period. Alternatively, one
could compute at at date t on load proﬁling using date-(t−1) data. Suppose
that the incumbent distributor is instructed to maximize intertemporal social
welfare subject to an intertemporal budget balance condition with discount
factor δ, and to the contestability condition:
−At + V (pt) ≥ V (a (pt−1)) for all t.
It can be shown that the resulting constrained Ramsey price is stationary:
pt = p∗∗, with:
E [(p∗∗ − pi)D′i (p∗∗)] = −δ
(
µ− 1
µ
)
(E [Di (p
∗∗)]) a′ (p∗∗) .
where µ is the shadow price of the intertemporal budget balance constraint.
For δ = 1, the solution is p∗∗ = p̂ (with µ = ∞). For δ = 0, then p∗∗ = p∗.
And, more generally, it can be shown that the optimal policy narrows the
gap between the unconstrained Ramsey price p∗ and the average wholesale
power cost: p∗ < p∗∗ < p̂ in case 1, p∗ > p∗∗ > p̂ in case 2, p∗ = p∗∗ = p̂ in
case 3.
14As suggested above, ring-fencing in practice serves a diﬀerent purpose: It aims at
preventing the shifting of the costs of the unregulated aﬃliate company to the regulated
distribution company and thus to the ratepayers.
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3 Partially price responsive consumers with
real-time meters
Let us now follow Borenstein and Holland (2003a,b) and assume that con-
sumers are equipped with a real-time meter, so that load proﬁling is not
necessary.15 Consumers react imperfectly to the real time prices p̂i that they
face (these real time prices p̂i are chosen by the LSE and can therefore dif-
fer from the wholesale prices pi). Borenstein and Holland (BH) depict this
situation by assuming that (a) a consumer reacts only to the average usage
price p̂ = E [p̂i] that he pays and not to the state-contingent price p̂i, and (b)
his demand, Di(p), by contrast, is state-contingent. The BH representation
presumes some bounded rationality on the consumer’s part. For, a rational
consumer ought to realize (at least) that the state of nature i she reacts
to and the price she will pay, p̂i, are correlated; for example, an American
consumer should realize that the use of air conditioning in a hot weather
condition is correlated with high electricity prices.
We now investigate sequentially the cases of rational and boundedly ra-
tional consumers. Rational consumers react imperfectly to the price proﬁle
that is oﬀered to them by the LSE, but they make eﬃcient use of the (endoge-
nously imperfect) knowledge of this price proﬁle and they trade oﬀ optimally
the transaction cost involved in improving their monitoring of the price pro-
ﬁle and in optimizing the usage of equipment, and the corresponding savings
in their electricity bill.
15A potential argument against the use of RTP for consumers is that it would obfuscate
price comparisons with existing tariﬀs; however, websites already facilitate such price
comparisons in the case of consumers with traditional meters. Another potential argument
against RTP relates to the consumers’ solvency or risk aversion; LSEs however could
bundle small-scale “contracts for diﬀerences” with their supply contracts for consumers
with real-time meters.
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3.1 Rational consumers
Let us ﬁrst motivate our analysis of rational consumers by a couple of exam-
ples, and then build a general theory.
Example 1 : Suppose that the state of nature is (ij) where i and j each
belong to [0, 1]. The joint density is denoted fij. The wholesale price is
pij. The consumer observes i (the local weather), but not j (the weather
elsewhere, or the availability of the transmission lines or generators).16 The
observable and unobservable components of uncertainty may be correlated.
The consumer’s gross surplus Si(q) depends only on the observable part of
the state of nature. Let p̂i = Ej [p̂ij] denote the average marginal price
when the observable component is i. Thus, a rational consumer chooses his
consumption qi when observing event i so as to solve:
max {Si (qi)− p̂iqi} ,
deﬁning a demand function qi = Di (p̂i).
The Ramsey optimum is then given by:
max
{p̂·,A}
{E [Si (Di (p̂i))− p̂iDi (p̂i)]− A}
s.t.
E [(p̂i − pij)Di (p̂i)] + A ≥ 0,
or
max
{p̂·}
{E [Si (Di (p̂i))− piDi (p̂i)]}
where pi ≡ Ej [pij] is the average wholesale price when the observable com-
ponent is i. The optimal policy is therefore a passthrough of the wholesale
16We here take this information structure as given. Presumably, it results from some
optimization as in the more general model considered below.
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price: p̂i = pi, which can for example be obtained by:
p̂ij = pij,
and to charge no ﬁxed fee: A = 0. Furthermore, LSE competition delivers
this optimal passthrough.
Example 2 : Let us next give an example in which the consumer does not
observe the state of nature, yet his consumption is state-dependent. Con-
sider equipment (e.g., space heater, air conditioning, pool heater) that, for
a given quality of service s (e.g., indoor temperature set once and for all by
the consumer) consumes a state-contingent amount of electricity. The real-
time price proﬁle of electricity aﬀects the quality s (for example, an increase
in winter prices lowers the indoor temperature chosen by the consumer or
induces the consumer to switch to oil heat).
More formally, letting j be the full description of the state of nature, the
consumer, who does not observe j, sets s so as to maximize his net surplus,
equal to the gross surplus S(s) minus the electricity bill:
Ej [S(s)− p̂jDj(s)]− A
where Dj(s) is the state-contingent consumption needed to reach level s (for
example a given swimming pool temperature requires a higher consumption
of electricity when the weather is cold). Let s (p̂·) denote the selected setting.
The Ramsey optimum then solves:
max
{p̂·,A}
{E [S (s (p̂·))− p̂jDj (s (p̂·))]− A}
s.t.
E [(p̂j − pj)Dj (s (p̂·))] + A ≥ 0,
or
max
{p̂·}
{E [S (s (p̂·))− pjDj (s (p̂·))]}
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Again, the Ramsey optimum (or the LSE’s equilibrium oﬀer for that matter)
is obtained by a passthrough policy:
p̂j = pj.
Let us now consider a more general environment and further allow the
consumer to choose his degree of awareness of the real time price. Namely,
let ω denote the state of nature (for instance, ω = (ij) in Example 1). Let
P denote the consumer’s partition (for example, P ((ij)) = i in Example 1).
That is, the consumer observes that ω belongs to an event P(ω). Let C(P)
denote the total transaction cost associated with partition P; one has in mind
that choosing a ﬁner partition P (for example, keeping informed of the real
time price) is costly, although we will not need to make this assumption.
The consumer in state ω takes a decision s that is measurable with respect
to partition P. This decision can be his electricity consumption as in Example
1, but can be diﬀerent from the consumption, as illustrated by Example
2. Let D (s (P(ω)) , ω) denote the associated consumption. Letting S(s, ω)
denote the consumer’s gross surplus, and p̂ω the usage price charged to the
consumer, for event P in the partition, s(P ) is given by
V (P ) = max
s
{E [S(s, ω)− p̂ωD(s, ω) | ω∈P ]}
and P is given by:
max
P
{EP∈P [V (P )]− C(P)− A} .
The budget constraint writes:
E [(p̂ω − pω)D (s (P(ω)) , ω)] + A ≥ 0.
Hence, the consumer’s utility is
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max
P
{
EP∈P
[
max
s
E [S (s, ω)− pωD (s, ω) | ω ∈P ]
]
− C(P)
}
. (7)
This utility is maximized when the consumer is confronted with the wholesale
prices: p̂ω = pω.
Proposition 4 With real-time meters and imperfectly reactive, but rational
consumers:
(i) the Ramsey optimum (consumption decision, consumer’s information)
is obtained when the consumer pays the real time wholesale price associated
with her actual consumption pattern;
(ii) retail competition delivers the Ramsey optimum.
3.2 Boundedly rational consumers
Let us next assume that, as in Example 1 above, consumers observe com-
ponent i of the state of nature (ij), although not the real time price pij ,
but fail to realize that they are representative of the consumer sample and
that the wholesale price is correlated with their demand. Their demand Di
depends only on the average price p̂ ≡ E [p̂ij] that they are oﬀered: Di (p̂).
In a sense, these consumers suﬀer from what Kahneman and Tversky (1973)
call the base-rate fallacy: they make insuﬃcient use of their prior beliefs and
incorrectly believe that because they do not observe the RT price, they are
facing the average price.
The Ramsey planner solves
max
{p̂,A}
{E [Si (Di (p̂))− p̂Di (p̂)]− A}
s.t.
E [(p̂− pij)Di (p̂)] + A ≥ 0.
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Eliminating A and maximizing with respect to p̂ yields
E [(p̂− pi)D′i (p̂)] = 0
where pi ≡ Ej [pij]. Retail competition as usual delivers the same outcome.
Proposition 5 With real-time meters and boundedly rational consumers:
(i) the Ramsey optimal average usage price p̂ is the same as under traditional
meters:
E [(p̂− pi)D′i (p̂)] = 0;
budget balance is achieved by setting A appropriately.
(ii) retail competition still delivers the (second-best) Ramsey optimum.
Remark : Part (i) of Proposition 5 can be found in Borenstein and Hol-
land. They do not ﬁnd the Ramsey outcome under retail competition (their
outcome actually is identical to the outcome of retail competition under tra-
ditional meters and load proﬁling — see Section 2.2), because they constrain
LSEs to oﬀer linear tariﬀs.
4 Non-scale heterogeneity and competitive screening
For expositional simplicity, we have assumed that consumers are homoge-
neous (perhaps up to a size factor σ). This section investigates the implica-
tions of consumer heterogeneity for retail competition.
Suppose that there are diﬀerent classes of consumers h ∈ [0, 1] with state-
contingent demands Dhi (p) and state-contingent surplus S
h
i
(
Dhi (p)
)
. Let nh
denote the frequencies of consumers of type h, and Eh [·] denote the expec-
tations with respect to consumer types (the expectations with respect to
the state of nature are now labeled Ei [·]). Let us begin with a few general
remarks.
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The ﬁrst is that under load proﬁling, the analysis of retail competition
is a simple generalization of that in Section 2. The retailers charge a linear
price p̂ given by
p̂ =
Ei
[
Eh
[
piD
h
i (p̂)
]]
Ei
[
Eh
[
Dhi (p̂)
]]
and fail to achieve the (second-best) Ramsey optimum. In particular, the
retailers face no adverse selection problem to the extent that they pay a per-
kWh price a = p̂ that is independent of the type of consumers they end up
attracting.
Neither do LSEs face an adverse selection problem when dealing with
rational consumers on real-time meters:17 Proposition 4 above showed that
it is optimal for LSEs to pass the wholesale price through to the consumer.
And so at the optimal contract, the LSE breaks even on usage in each state of
nature. Its proﬁt is therefore unaﬀected by the consumer’s actual load proﬁle.
Consumer heterogeneity then has no impact on competitive outcomes.
Competitive screening18 issues arise only in the case of bounded rational
consumers with real time meters (Section 3.2). This is the case because
passthrough of wholesale prices is then in general suboptimal, consumers
diﬀer in their load proﬁles and LSEs need to be careful of who they attract.
This situation is reminiscent of Rothschild and Stiglitz’s celebrated treatment
of insurance markets (1976).
A complete analysis of competitive screening with boundedly rational
consumers with real time meters in retail electricity markets lies out of the
scope of the paper. Rather, we will content ourselves with an illustrative
17They may face forms of adverse selection unrelated to the consumer’s load proﬁle. For
example, LSEs may try to obtain superior information about the probability of consumer
default.
18Much of the theory of competitive non-linear pricing has been developed in the context
of private values, that is when suppliers care solely about price and quantity, and not, per
se, to whom they sell: See Rochet-Stole (2002, 2003). Here the context is one with common
values.
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example. Time is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The state-contingent price
(depicted by the dotted line in Figure 1) is increasing linearly in i:
pi = i.
Consumers at any period i ∈ [0, 1] consume 0 or 1 unit of electricity. Suppose
that there are two categories of consumers. Their state-contingent willingness
to pay is depicted in Figure 1.
willingness to
pay
p i
0 1
2
1
i
“Oﬀ-peak consumers”
(proportion ρ)
willingness to
pay
p i
b > 1
0 1
2
1
i
“Peak consumers”
(proportion 1−ρ)
Figure 1
Oﬀ-peak consumers, when consuming q units (i.e., when consuming a
fraction of time q), consume during [0, q]. Their gross surplus is then19
S1(q) ≡ 1
2
q.
Peak consumers prefer to consume at peak and obtain gross surplus
1
2
+
19A constant willingness to pay is chosen for computational simplicity. To have them
strictly prefer to consume their allotment q oﬀ peak, one can have in mind a gross surplus
of unit q equal to 1/2 + ε(q) with ε′ < 0, and then take the limit as ε(q) converges to 0
uniformly.
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b(
i− 1
2
)
from consuming one unit in state i, where b > 1; thus, their gross
surplus from consuming a fraction q of the time is
S2(q) =
∫ 1
1−q
[
1
2
+ b
(
i− 1
2
)]
di =
(b + 1)q − bq2
2
.
The cost of wholesale electricity purchases for both types are, respectively:
C1(q) =
∫ q
0
idi =
q2
2
and
C2(q) =
∫ 1
1−q
idi =
2q − q2
2
> C1(q) whenever 0 < q < 1.
Letting ρ and 1− ρ denote the fraction of oﬀ-peak and peak consumers and
ignoring in a ﬁrst step incentive compatibility, the Ramsey optimum solves:
max
{q1,q2}
{ρ [S1 (q1)− C1 (q1)] + (1− ρ) [S2 (q2)− C2 (q2)]} ,
yielding, as one would expect,
q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
1
2
.
To be incentive compatible, the two types must pay the same total amount:
T ∗1 = T
∗
2 since they consume the same amount. Accordingly, achieving
the Ramsey allocation in the absence of retail competition requires cross-
subsidies. As
ρ [T1 − C1 (q∗1)] + (1− ρ) [T2 − C2 (q∗2)] = 0
C1 (q
∗
1) < T
∗
1 = T
∗
2 < C2 (q
∗
2) .
Let us now consider retail competition. LSEs can safely oﬀer to peak con-
sumers their symmetric allocation contract (q∗2, T2 = C2 (q
∗
2)), since they
would make money if the oﬀ-peak consumer were to take this contract. Let
us look for conditions under which the market oﬀers (q∗2, T2 = C2 (q
∗
2)) to the
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peak consumers and (q1 = q̂1, T1 = T̂1 = C1 (q̂1) ) to the oﬀ-peak consumers.
The incentive-compatibility-constraint is
S2 (q
∗
2)− C2 (q∗2) ≥ S2 (q1)− C1 (q1) ,
or
b− 1
8
≥ (b + 1) (q1 − q
2
1)
2
.
This latter condition, satisﬁed with equality, deﬁnes a unique q̂1 in
(
1
2
, 1
)
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This separating equilibrium is an equilibrium provided that no LSE can
oﬀer a pooling contract with higher payoﬀs for both types. This is the case
if ρ ≤ ρ∗ for some ρ∗ ∈ (0, 1).21 However, this equilibrium does not achieve
the Ramsey optimum.
Proposition 6 With heterogeneous consumers:
(i) Adverse selection does not arise when consumers are either on traditional
meters and load proﬁled, or on real-time meters and rational. The analysis
of Sections 2 and 3.1 thus generalizes to heterogeneous consumers.
(ii) By contrast, with boundedly rational consumers on real-time meters,
adverse selection and the concomitant competitive screening prevent retail
competition from achieving the Ramsey outcome, unlike in the case of homo-
geneous consumers.
5 Incentives to install real-time meters and
communication equipment
Let us investigate the consequences of the previous analysis of the case where
there are traditional meters, load proﬁling and retail competition for retail-
20In our example S1 (q1) − C1 (q1) = S1 (q1) − S2 (q1) + U∗2 is symmetric around 1/2,
and so type 1 is indiﬀerent between separating at q̂1 or 1− q̂1.
21To prove this, maximize S1 (q1)−T1, subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:
U∗2 + ∆ ≥ S2 (q1) − T1 (where U∗2 = S2 (q∗2) − C2 (q∗2) and ∆ ≥ 0) and to the break-even
condition: ρ [T1 − C1 (q1)]− (1− ρ)∆ ≥ 0.
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ers’ incentives to install real-time meters with or without communication,
starting with the Ramsey incentives. Suppose that consumers have the same
load proﬁle but diﬀer in the size σ of their demand: Consumer of type σ has
demand qi = σDi(p) and surplus σSi (qi/σ). There is a continuous distribu-
tion of consumers σ on [0,∞).
Consumers initially have traditional meters and thus cannot react to the
RTP. Two types of equipment can be added to a traditional meter:22
• a real-time meter, costing m > 0, that measures and makes veriﬁable
the consumer’s RT consumption, but makes this consumption imper-
fectly reactive to the RTP as in Section 3;
• communication (on top of real-time metering), costing M > m, that
furthermore makes it possible for consumers to perfectly react to the
RT prices through remote control of appliances and equipment.
Ramsey benchmark.
Consider a rational consumer with type σ = 1. Let UFB be the utility
that this consumer could obtain if her consumption could adjust eﬃciently
to variations in the real time price (see (1) above). Let U∗ be the second-best
utility that could be achieved by a Ramsey social planner for the consumer
with a traditional meter (see (3) above). And let U∗∗∈
(
U∗, UFB
)
denote her
utility when endowed with a real-time meter without communication (See
(7)) above. The utilities of a consumer with type σ are equal to σ times
these utilities. The Ramsey planner (or a monopoly retailer) would endow
consumers in (σ∗, σ∗∗) with a real-time meter, and those in (σ∗∗,∞) with real
22Note that we assume that there are no returns to scale in installing equipments.
In practice, LSEs incur costs, such as wireless bay stations enabling remote real time
recording, that are common across consumers in a neighborhood. Such costs give rise to
non-convexities and ineﬃciencies unless they are shared among LSEs.
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time meters plus communication, where:23
σ∗ =
m
U∗∗ − U∗ and σ
∗∗ =
M −m
UFB − U∗∗ .
Load proﬁling.
We keep the assumption that the consumption of retail consumers with
traditional meters is load proﬁled using the load proﬁle of the consumers in
that class. Under perfect retail competition with load proﬁled consumers,
the consumer obtains σURC when keeping a traditional meter, σU∗∗ − m
when equipped with a real-time meter, and σUFB −M when equipped with
communication.
Simple derivations yield:
Proposition 7 (i) Under pure retail competition with load proﬁling:
• Consumers with type σ ≥ σ∗∗ are equipped with communication, where
σ∗∗ is the Ramsey level.
• Consumers with type σ ∈ [σRC , σ∗∗) are equipped with real-time meters,
when σRC = m/
[
U∗∗ − URC] < σ∗, the Ramsey level.
(ii) Consequently, there is more investment in meters that measure real-time
consumption than in the Ramsey optimum. Given the ineﬃciencies intro-
duced by the combination of load proﬁling and retail competition, however
investments are socially optimal.
The constrained eﬃciency of market-determined investment in metering
equipment (part (ii) of the proposition) deserves some comment. There are
really two Ramsey benchmarks, one unconstrained by retail competition and
the other constrained by retail competition. The investments are socially
23Assuming (U∗∗ − U∗)M ≥ (UFB − U∗)m. Otherwise, it is not optimal to install
real-time meters without communication.
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optimal given the ineﬃciencies created by retail competition with load pro-
ﬁling.
6 The joint interruptibility problem
In our companion paper (Joskow-Tiro1e 2004) we derive the eﬃcient prices
and investment program for an electricity market with demand uncertainty,
price insensitive consumers, and LSEs that can choose any level of rationing
they prefer contingent on the real time price. We then identify the assump-
tions required for a competitive wholesale and retail market equilibrium to
achieve this eﬃcient price and investment program. One of the key assump-
tions is that diﬀerent users can choose and the system operator can im-
plement diﬀerent levels of priority in rationing that reﬂect users’ individual
preferences. The validity of this assumption requires the system operator to
be able physically to cut oﬀ individual retail consumers.
There is no theoretical reason why individual customers cannot be ra-
tioned. It requires installing communications and control equipment between
the customer’s connection to the network and the control center. However,
this equipment is costly. As a practical matter, except for very large cus-
tomers that have direct control equipment, most directed interruptions must
occur at points on the network (“zones”) that can be controlled by the dis-
tribution network operator.24 The aﬀected zone has (a) customers served by
multiple LSEs that compete with one another (so every house on a street
can be “served” by a diﬀerent LSE) and (b) customers with heterogeneous
24In reality, system operators generally try to squeeze out all of the price sensitive
demand ﬁrst before they start rolling blackouts. This may not be optimal of course.
There is also some priority rationing in that circuits with hospitals and ﬁre stations, etc.
will often be placed on a “do not blackout list.” In this case, all customers on the same
circuit get the beneﬁt of being near a ﬁre station or hospital. This example illustrates the
fact that diﬀerent consumers may have diﬀerent values of lost load, and that furthermore
the dispatcher cannot ﬁne-tune the intensity of rationing.
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preferences.
An optimal dispatch when zones but not individual consumers are con-
trolled by the system operator must elicit each zone’s aggregate willingness to
pay for being served. From the point of view of the set of LSEs and industrial
users in a given zone, reliability is a public good.
In principle, one can make use of the theory of public goods in order to de-
sign incentive-compatible mechanisms of elicitation of individual preferences
for reliability.25 For instance, one could use the Clarke (1971)-Groves(1973)
scheme. Suppose that, due to a shortage in supply, the ISO must shut down
one of cities A,B,C,... To simplify computations, cities demand the same
load. Within city A, say, there are n users, each demanding 1 unit of load
and having valuations (VOLL) vi, which are private information. These users
can either be price-sensitive, industrial users or LSEs serving price-insensitive
users. Let the ISO shut down the city with the lowest total declared willing-
ness to pay. That is, city A is served if and only if
VˆA ≡
∑
i∈A
vˆi ≥ Vˆ
where Vˆ is the lowest total declared willingness to pay among other cities.
City A then pays Vˆ . The problem then boils down to a standard public
good problem (the cost of getting the public good is Vˆ -possibly unknown to
members of city A, but this does not matter as this value is revealed through
the aggregate bids in other cities).
In particular, use can be made of Clarke-Groves mechanisms : Member i of
city i pays
25See Green-Laﬀont (1979a,b) for the general theory of public goods.
34
{
Vˆ −∑j =i vˆi if vˆi +∑j =i vˆj ≥ Vˆ
0 otherwise.
Telling the truth (vˆi = vi) is then a dominant strategy. [The Clark-Groves
mechanism does not balance the ISO’s budget, but a variant of it (the
d’Aspremont-Gerard Varet (1979) scheme) does so in expectation.]
Besides transaction costs, there is under retail competition a major snag
with such zonal voting mechanisms. While large industrial users’ willingness
to pay for reliability is not distorted by competition for the ﬁnal consumer,26
competing retailers’ proﬁt in a given zone depends only on the relative quality
of their oﬀer as compared with their competitors’. A retailer that bids for
reliability increases the quality of service to its retail consumers, but it also
increases its rivals’ quality of service by the same amount, bringing no extra
proﬁt. This is best seen when considering the following timing: First, LSEs
bid for reliability (v̂zk for LSE k in zone z). Second, given the resulting
reliability in each zone z, they compete for retail consumers. Given that
they make no proﬁt at stage 2, LSEs aim at minimizing expenditure at state
1 (they have de facto willingness to pay vzk = 0 in reference to our previous
discussion).
Proposition 8 Zonal rationing implies that the demand for rationing in a
given zone is an aggregated demand.
(i) In the absence of transaction costs, the constrained optimum can be
obtained through standard public goods mechanisms if consumers are (non-
competing) industrial users and retail consumers served by a monopoly dis-
tributor.
(ii) By contrast, the elicitation of consumers’ willingness to pay for non-
26Unless two large industrial users both compete on the product market and produce in
the same zone.
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interruptibility is problematic under retail competition. In particular, if LSEs
bid for reliability and then compete for retail consumers, no information can
be obtained from LSEs concerning the consumers’ demand for non-interruptibility.
7 Conclusion
In our companion paper (Joskow-Tirole 2004) we derive the optimal prices
and investment program when there is state contingent demand, at least some
consumers do not react to real time prices, but their LSE can choose any level
of rationing it prefers contingent on real time prices. In this model consumers
are identical, possibly up to a proportionality factor, and therefore all have
the same load proﬁle. We then derive the competitive equilibrium under
these assumptions when there are competing LSEs that can oﬀer two-part
tariﬀs. This leads to a proposition that extends the standard welfare theorem
to price-insensitive consumers and rationing; this proposition serves as an
important benchmark for evaluating a number of non-market obligations and
regulatory mechanisms:
The second best optimum (given the presence of price-insensitive con-
sumers) can be implemented by an equilibrium with retail and generation
(wholesale) competition provided that:
(a) The real time wholesale price accurately reﬂects the social opportunity
cost of generation.
(b) Rationing, if any, is orderly, and makes eﬃcient use of available gen-
eration.
(c) LSEs face the real time wholesale price for the aggregate consumption
of the retail customers for whom they are responsible.
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(d) Consumers who can react fully to the real time price are not rationed.
Furthermore, the LSEs serving consumers who cannot fully react to the
real time price can demand any level of rationing they prefer contingent
on the real-time price.
(e) Consumers have the same load proﬁle (they are identical up to a scale
factor).
The assumptions underlying this benchmark proposition are obviously
very strong. Our companion paper examines the implications of relaxing
assumptions (a) and (b). This paper focuses on retail competition and ex-
amines the implications of departures from assumptions (c), (d) and (e).
When retail consumers are on traditional meters which measure their
aggregate consumption over relatively long time periods rather than in real
time, neither retail consumers nor, under retail competition, the LSEs re-
sponsible for purchasing the power required to serve their demand face the
real time wholesale prices associated with the power they consume from the
system. We derive the Ramsey optimal two-part tariﬀs given consumer insen-
sitivity to the real time price and show that when there is retail competition
with load proﬁling the Ramsey optimal prices are not a competitive equilib-
rium. In particular, the competitive retail market equilibrium involves linear
average wholesale cost pricing rather than more eﬃcient two-part tariﬀs. We
go on to examine competition between independent LSEs and the incumbent
distributor which also has the responsibility to serve retail consumers who are
not served by independent LSEs. We show that independent LSEs can enter
proﬁtably against the incumbent if the incumbent oﬀers the Ramsey optimal
prices and that requiring the incumbent distributor through an aﬃliate that
is “ring-fenced” does not change its behavior.
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We next examine cases where consumers have real time meters but are
either unresponsive or only partially responsive to variations in real time
prices. In general, the Ramsey optimum is achieved with retail competition
when consumers are identical up to a scaling factor and are rational.
We then extend the analysis to non-scale heterogeneity. Remarkably, ad-
verse selection and the concomitant competitive screening do not arise under
either load proﬁling or RT metering provided that consumers are rational.
By contrast, competitive screening arises and severely distorts the allocation
under boundedly rational consumers.
We go on to examine the incentives competing LSEs face to install two
types of advanced metering equipment when consumers initially have tradi-
tional meters. We ﬁnd that there is more investment in meters that measure
real time consumption than in the Ramsey optimum. However, given the
ineﬃciencies introduced by the combination of load proﬁling and retail com-
petition, investments in advanced metering are socially optimal.
Finally, we consider the eﬀects of the inability of the system operator
physically to cut oﬀ individual customer loads. Instead rationing must be
done on a “zonal” basis, perhaps involving rationing of both price sensitive
and price insensitive retail consumers. This physical constraint means that
individual retail customers cannot obtain their preferred priority for rationing
by the system operator. Given this constraint, the Ramsey social planner
could turn to standard public goods mechanisms to determine the relative
priorities of the diﬀerent zones that are physically capable of being cut oﬀ
by the system operator and use this information to establish a second-best
priority cutoﬀ schedule. By contrast, in the presence of retail competition no
information can be obtained by LSEs concerning their consumers’ demand
for non-interruptibility because they would prefer to free ride on the other
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LSEs serving consumers in the same zone.
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